Violent Distortions: Bearing Witness to the Task of Wartime Translators by Stahuljak, Zrinka
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Violent Distortions: Bearing Witness to the Task of Wartime Translators"
 
Zrinka Stahuljak
TTR : traduction, terminologie, rédaction, vol. 13, n° 1, 2000, p. 37-51.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/037392ar
DOI: 10.7202/037392ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 12 février 2017 03:04
Violent Distortions: Bearing Witness 
to the Task of Wartime Translators 
Zrinka Stahuljak 
To understand Shoah is not to know 
the Holocaust, but [...] to grasp the 
ways in which erasure is itself part 
of the functioning of our history1. 
It is undeniable that the translator plays a crucial role in the gathering 
of historical testimonies and that translation is, in a very literal sense, 
central to their transmission. While the issue of translation in its 
relation to testimony has been discussed in theoretical texts written on 
the subject of catastrophic war events, the translator has until now 
remained in the theory of testimony a marginal and even erased figure 
whose specificity eludes us. I propose that to focus on the translator in 
the empirical situations of translation in war may force us, however, to 
I would like to thank my dissertation advisor Claire Nouvet for her generous 
help and encouragement in the preparation of this article. I also thank the 
anonymous reader of the article whose comments encouraged me to develop 
the section on the relation of theory of translation to the translator's position of 
witness. 
An earlier, short version of this article was presented at the "Literary and 
Cultural Translation and Exchange" Conference of the American Comparative 
Literature Association, held at the University of Texas - Austin, March 25-28, 
1998. 
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony. Crises of Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, New York; London: Routledge, 1992. 
p. 253, Felman's emphasis. 
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rethink the foundations of the relationship of testimony and translation. 
I will begin by exploring the position that the translator and translation 
occupy in the theory of testimony, most notably in Shoshana Felman's 
and Dori Laub's book Testimony. Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History. I will then further this inquiry by 
considering the case of Croatian translators in the 1991-1992 war in 
Croatia2. 
In her discussion of Shoah, Claude Lanzmann's film on the 
Holocaust, Shoshana Felman proposes that the presence of the 
translator is necessary in the testimonial process: 
The technique of dubbing is not used, and the character of the 
translator is deliberately not edited out of the film — on the contrary, 
she is quite often present on the screen, at the side of Lanzmann, [...] 
because the process of translation is itself an integral part of the film. 
(Felman, p. 211) 
The translator's presence is necessary because she renders an 
incomprehensible language accessible to Lanzmann, the interviewer of 
Holocaust witnesses. Translation itself is understood as "an integral 
part of the film" because it functions as a metaphor for the 
interpretation, transmission and passing-on of a historical event, the 
Holocaust: "It is a metaphor of the film that its language is a language 
of translation" (Felman, p. 212)3. On the one hand, linguistic translation 
becomes a metaphor by virtue of representing "the splitting of 
eyewitnessing" (Felman, p. 212). In other words, the temporal delay in 
consecutive translation stands for "the incapacity of seeing to translate 
itself spontaneously and simultaneously into a meaning" (Felman, p. 
2
 Since in Testimony (chapter entitled "The Return of the Voice: Claude 
Lanzmann's Shoah"), Felman does not examine closely the position of the 
linguistic translator, I found it necessary to venture outside the immediate 
frame of reference of the book, while still maintaining a larger frame of 
catastrophic war events. Thus, I remain deeply indebted to Felman's ground-
breaking work on the relationship between testimony and translation which 
allowed me to begin rethinking this relationship in terms of the translator. The 
type of translation is the same in both cases: consecutive translation. 
In a literal sense, translation is a language of the film in so far as the film's 
language is French, "the native language of the filmmaker" but not "the 
language of any of the witnesses" (p. 212). 
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212). On the other hand, because meaning is still not immediately 
available after linguistic translation, the "literal" meaning of 
testimonies must undergo further "translation" by the filmmaker and 
the historian who are 
catalysts — or agents — of the process of reception, agents whose 
reflective witnessing and whose testimonial stances aid our own 
reception and assist us both in the effort toward comprehension and 
in the unending struggle with the foreignness of signs [...] (Felman, p. 
213; her emphasis) 
The interviewer, the historian and the spectator are thus given 
testimonial stances, they become "witnesses of [original] witnesses, 
witnesses of the testimonies" (Felman, p. 213)4. In the sense that 
bearing witness inevitably entails a removal from the "original" 
occurrence, "translation [...] becomes a metaphor for the historical 
necessity of bearing witness [...]" (Felman, p. 153). It is a metaphor for 
the foreignness of witnessing and of bearing witness, a metaphor for 
that which is untranslatable, 
the very namelessness of a catastrophe which cannot be possessed by 
any native tongue and which, within the language of translation, can 
only be named as the untranslatable: that which language cannot 
witness; that which cannot be articulated in one language; that which 
language, in its turn, cannot witness without splitting. (Felman, pp. 
212-213; her emphasis) 
The foreignness of language is inherent to translation. The catastrophe 
splits the language, it renders it inadequate to the event. Likewise, 
translation, split between at least two languages, embodies the very 
tension between the seeing and the unseeable, the saying and the 
unsayable, by always leaving a remainder that is beyond translation and 
which remains both foreign to language and within the foreign 
language. Although the act of translation thus represents the process of 
testimonial transmission, the translator is nevertheless reduced to a 
position of minor consequence in that she is "processing [...] merely 
[...] the literal meaning of testimonies" (Felman, p. 213). While her 
empirical position remains unaccounted for, her concrete linguistic 
In Laub's terms, the interviewer is a witness to the witness — he steps into the 
position of a secondary witness to assist in the emergence of testimony from the 
original witness. 
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performance becomes a theoretical metaphor for the kind of 
"translation" into meaning that the interviewer, the historian, and 
ultimately the spectator, are said to perform. The translator, who like 
them, has been identified as a "second-degree witness" (Felman, p. 
213), is denied a testimonial stance, because she transmits "merely [...] 
the literal meaning of the testimonies. Thus, even though the translator 
is central to the testimonial process, she remains on the margins of the 
theory of testimony. Moreover, any indication of her testimonial stance 
is perceived as a "distortion". 
[T]he translator in some ways distorts and screens [the 
visual/acoustic information] because (as is attested by those viewers 
who are native-speakers of the foreign tongues which the translator is 
translating, and as the film itself points out by some of Lanzmann's 
interventions and corrections) the translation is not always absolutely 
accurate5. (Felman, p. 212) 
I argue, however, that this "distortion" is a unique and otherwise 
unrecognizable testimony of the translator. Moreover, this testimony of 
the translator provides us with the means to rethink the relationship 
between testimony and translation. I propose the case of the Croatian 
translators in and of the war in order first to better understand the 
reasons for which the translator is denied the testimonial stance that the 
filmmaker, the historian, and the spectator have, and then to suggest the 
ways in which this "distortion" emerges as the translator's testimony6. 
5
 "L'interprète ne voulait pas traduire ce qu'elle entendait [...] Parfois elle 
gauchissait tout, mes questions, les réponses. Elle les adoucissait. À d'autres 
moments elle était coincée par la vérité, et elle explosait dans sa traduction 
d'une façon très brutale. En fait, mon questionnement têtu la rendait elle-même 
folle, et de temps en temps elle me jetait ça au visage, exactement ce qu'ils 
disaient, parce qu'elle n'en pouvait plus," says Claude Lanzmann of the Polish 
translator in Shoah. "Les non-lieux de la mémoire," in Au Sujet de Shoah, le 
film de Claude Lanzmann, Paris: Belin, 1990. pp. 280-291. 
6
 This portion of the article is based on 24 interviews with Croatian translators 
conducted by the Croatian social psychologist Ivan Magdalenic from Fall '92 to 
Spring '93. Ten translators are female, ages 19-50, and fourteen are male, ages 
18-41. Along with the accounts provided by my former colleagues, I draw 
information from my own personal experience. I wish to emphasize, however, 
that all the quotes are taken from Magdalenic's study. All the translations from 
Croatian into English are mine. The quotes appear in quotation marks and 
italics in the body of the text, so as to distinguish them from other quotes and 
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The 1991-1992 war in Croatia erupted as a result of a conflict 
about borders between Croatia and Serbia during the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. The urgency of this first major armed conflict on European 
soil since World War II required immediate action by the Western 
allied powers. They responded by setting up the European Community 
Monitor Mission (henceforth ECMM)7. ECMM's task was to inform a 
larger international politico-military community of the war events in 
Croatia with the objectives of negotiating a cease-fire and monitoring 
the respect of minority rights. In order to follow the progress of the 
conflict and to gather the information necessary to complete their task, 
EC monitors collected testimonies from the members of the warring 
parties, Croats and Serbs alike, civilians and military, on and close to 
the front-lines. Ethnic Croat translators translated witnesses' oral 
testimonies into English, the lingua franca of the Mission. Without the 
translator these testimonies could not be transmitted and thus the 
triangular structure of translation was formed: the interviewer (an EC 
monitor), the witness (a Croat or a Serb), and the translator (an ethnic 
Croat)8. 
But why does an ethnic Croat accept to translate a war? She 
accepts after the ECMM invites Croats to volunteer as translators. She 
volunteers precisely because she is politically involved in the conflict. 
She volunteers out of "patriotism," because she wants "to do 
something" "to help" by using her language skills. The translator 
volunteers out of the desire to be a witness, "to see for myself what is 
really happening on the front-lines." Most importantly, she accepts in 
order to testify herself, a desire to which she confesses only in 
situations outside translation: 
other uses of quotation marks. To maintain consistency with Felman's text, I 
continue referring to the translator as "she." 
7
 At the time when the European Community Monitor Mission was set up, the 
European Community had not yet changed its name to the European Union. At 
that time it was comprised of 12 member-countries: Germany, France, England, 
Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Denmark 
and Luxembourg. 
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub work with these three terms, albeit not 
explicitly in terms of a triangular structure. 
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"A translator cannot and should not be just a 'transmitter. ' One needs 
to have unofficial conversations. " 
"Regardless of the official function, I try to play the role of an 
unofficial representative of the Republic of Croatia, I explain the 
situation in this part of the world to the monitors. " 
The patriotic response of the translator who volunteers fulfills the first 
condition of possibility of translation — her physical presence. 
However, the very structure of translation does not allow the 
translator to be the patriotic, engaged witness that she wants to be. 
Another condition of possibility conflicting with the desire to bear 
witness has to be satisfied before the translation structure can transmit 
testimony. Within this structure, the translator functions as the conduit 
of an address from which she is excluded. Through the translator, the 
interviewer and the witness address and are addressed respectively: 
they become interlocutors. The translator as the third term remains 
outside the address; she is a mere "intermediary" (Felman, p. 211) 
through whom the address takes place. The translator's linguistic 
neutrality is necessary to the transmission of a witness' testimony, even 
in cases when the translator feels insulted: 
"/ translated all of her words [insults] calmly." 
"One of the monitors was saying bad things about Croatian politics. I 
did not participate in the debate." 
To translate "calmly" indicates that the translator is focused on 
maintaining a certain relationship to language. On the other hand, not to 
"participate in the debate" testifies to her attempt to keep her linguistic 
fonction apart from her testimonial desire. The translator transmits the 
words of the witness without performing any evaluative or 
interpretative gesture in translation. She translates this structural 
neutrality in terms of professionalism and responsibility: 
"lam apart of the team" 
"[I]t is all a part of the job" 
"Translation is a job of responsibility" 
"I try to maintain objectivity, professionalism. Even though I am a 
volunteer, lam still a professional." 
Because she is a "professional" the translator must erase herself, at 
least while translating. 
42 
Thus, to translate for someone else was originally a way of 
bearing witness, a way of infiltrating the testimonial structure because 
of the desire to participate, to testify. Translation was seen as a weapon 
to occupy the position of an interlocutor, to persuade the EC monitors 
that Croatia was the victim in the conflict, aggressed by the Serb 
minority of Croatia and by Serbia proper. But the requirement of 
professional neutrality erases the translator's testimony. In other words, 
the translator, who accepts to translate in order to testify, is denied the 
very possibility of testimony. The two conditions that make translation 
in and of a war possible, the desire to bear witness and maintain 
linguistic neutrality, come into conflict with each other. The positions 
of the witness and the translator are mutually exclusive. The actual 
borderline conflict that she translates for the international community 
produces in the translator a violent internal conflict: she is torn between 
political allegiance to her native country and professional neutrality, in 
other words between testimony and translation. So in order to transmit 
the border conflict, she herself becomes the site of a violent conflict. 
Furthermore, she is working on the front-lines, the site of the physical 
violence of war, the front lines that form the internal borders within 
Croatia9. This physical position on the margins parallels the marginal, 
self-erased position of the translator as the third term of the structure of 
translation. 
We thus end up with this paradox of the translator of 
testimonies: while she sees herself as "a part of the team," she is 
nevertheless marginalized and excluded from it. The structural 
impossibility of speaking from within translation and the necessity of 
persuasion from within it, combine to produce an internal conflict in 
the translator. This tension is heightened by the life-threatening 
exposure on the front-lines and the witnessing of horrifying events: 
"The most difficult are the stories of [Croatian] refugees and 
displaced persons. " 
"Six buses with [Croatian] refugees were arriving, and they [the 
Serbs] were shooting at them, the situation was very tense, and I was 
hiding with the monitors in some ditch." 
"A meeting with the parents of a child born in the refugee camp was 
very moving " 
These front-lines constituted the internal borders between the free Croatia and 
the Croatian territory occupied by the Serbs. 
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"On several occasions, I was at an exhumation (from the well, from 
the cornfield) and at the exchange of corpses, and I translated the 
identification procedure. It was sickening to look at the corpse taken 
out of the well" 
"I saw massacred bodies of [Croatian] soldiers and civilians. I also 
watched a village burning at night" 
The translator is further tested when the speakers of the target language 
do not have adequate linguistic competence in it: 
"The most difficult situation is when monitors speak poor English 
and then sometimes blame me for what they didn't understand" 
"Among monitors there are those who are not up to the occasion, 
also with poor language control, unfamiliar with translation 
techniques. " 
These pressures on the translator eventually result in a failure of 
neutral, professional translation, a "distortion" (Felman, p. 212). A 
translator was recalled from duty after "[mjostly translating, although I 
was explaining to them what was happening there." Other translators 
confess: 
"/ 'jump in', it's more than translation: conversations with monitors, 
discussions about everything that is going on, explanation of our 
[Croatian] situation. " 
"Sometimes there is a need to speak in one's own language, without 
translation." 
The structure of address within which translation takes place is 
exploded as the translator stands on the physical borders of the front-
lines. The translator becomes a subject speaking for herself, no longer 
just an "intermediary" with no personal history. She becomes a witness 
through her interpretation, in her failure to be a translator. However, 
acting as a witness, the translator fails to render faithfully the testimony 
of an original witness. She diverts the address to herself and responds 
in lieu of the original witness, only to find herself testifying, not, as she 
originally desired, to the war events, but instead to her own task and 
failure as the translator, as well as to the inadequacy of language. 
The translator's disruption is undeniably a violent act 
committed against the witnesses and their testimony. But precisely 
because this failure of translation can, at any given moment, disrupt the 
testimonial structure, thereby reminding the witness, the interviewer, 
the historian and the spectator of the precariousness of the translator's 
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"professional," "neutral" and "self-erasing" stance, I believe it has to be 
read as testimony. At that moment the translator testifies to the fact that 
she has no testimonial stance within translation. The translator's 
internal conflict, otherwise kept under control with self-erasure, erupts 
in the failure of "neutral" translation and demands acknowledgment. 
The translator testifies to the fact that while translating she can never 
bear witness politically. Her failure also reveals that the translator 
cannot bear witness to herself structurally from within translation. 
Bearing witness to being a translator can only happen outside this 
structure, in the moment when translation stops, when there is no 
longer a translator. 
The task of the translator requires a radical self-erasure while 
translating. What is erased is the translator's testimony. But in addition, 
she also erases the witness' testimony as she translates it. Indeed, the 
structure of consecutive translation is such that in order to "receive" the 
continuous flow of the testimony, the translator must listen, deliver a 
translation and erase from her memory what she just translated in order 
to repeat the move over and over again: receive, deliver, forget. 
Translation is not a memorizing but a forgetting — a forgetting of 
oneself and a forgetting of what is heard. For the translator, the event of 
testimony is an unrecognized event. Paradoxically, the transmission of 
a testimony which is translated precisely in order to be remembered 
happens through a forgetting. 
Translation requires yet another erasure: the erasure of 
translation itself. The self-erasure of the translator incarnates, as it 
were, the self-erasure of translation. Translation, where the translator 
remains self-erased throughout, makes itself transparent and performs 
what Jean-François Lyotard calls the dream of a pre-Babel state, of an 
ideal form of interlinguistic communication in which there is no need 
for translation. That is every translation's ideal. To render itself useless, 
impossible even, and to erase the interlinguistic gap which motivates 
it."10 As the translator erases herself, makes her physical presence 
transparent, so does the translation erase itself from the testimony that 
it translates. Born out of an interlinguistic gap, it aims at making us 
forget this gap. 
Jean-François Lyotard, "Foreword" in The Lyotard Reader, ed. Andrew 
Benjamin, Cambridge, MA : B. Blackwell, 1989, pp. vi-xiv. 
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Theories of testimony both reiterate and forget the translator's 
self-erasure when they use her as a mere metaphor. As we saw, all three 
agents of the testimony structure, the interviewer, the historian and the 
spectator, have been compared to the "professional interpreter" in so far 
as they are asked to "receive" the testimony (Felman, p. 213) and 
"translate" it. This "translation" is itself likened to "bearing witness" 
(Felman, p. 153). But the reception on the part of the translator differs 
from that of the others: it requires her self-erasure as a witness. 
Theories of testimony acknowledge the specificity of the translator's 
position: "[T]his impossibility of witnessing is paradoxically inherent 
in the very position of the translator, whose task is nonetheless to try to 
render — to bear witness — to the original" (Felman, p. 159), only to 
forget it. In order to use translation as a metaphor of testimony, the 
theory of testimony must forget the specificity of the translator's 
position in the structure of testimony. It must erase the translator's self-
erasure as a witness. 
Ironically, the theory of testimony is unable to recognize that 
the translator does become a witness precisely when she fails to 
translate. So, to what does the failure of self-erasure in translation 
testify? The failure ill translation highlights the erasure that the 
structure of testimony requires. It reminds us that the witness' 
testimony is "normally" passed on through the erasure of the translator 
and of translation itself. In her failure, the translator is testifying to the 
interlinguistic gap that motivates translation, to the erasure that it 
requires and to the impossibility of providing a smooth and exhaustive 
translation. Her failure indicates that there is something which does not 
lend itself to translation, that the testimony will always remain partially 
unavailable. The translator's failure is a mark of the untranslatable, the 
inaccessible. In the case of a war, the failure of translation is a passing-
on of the untranslatability of the conflict and its history. It tells us that 
the scandal of a war is unacceptable and unassimilable to mere 
translation. Not only does the failure testify to a conflict, but its violent 
disruption reiterates the very scandal of war. It reminds us that the 
shock, the violence of an event such as a war, cannot be 
translated/processed without "shocking" the very structure of its 
transmission, and especially any claim to neutrality. War is a proof of 
history that is too complex, too inaccessible, untranslatable, to be 
understood in its own terms. Instead, it opens itself to recognition in the 
moment of failure, the literal inscription of tension and violence in the 
translation: 
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The translation is thus not quite a cognition but, rather, a performance 
of historical change to which it testifies in the very process of 
achieving it, of putting the change into effect (Felman, p. 163). 
But with the self-erasure and neutralization of the translator, the fact 
that the war is accessed only through translation, mediation, is itself 
erased, neutralized. The failure of the translator testifies to this 
mediation. Finally, it bears witness to the fact that the translation of a 
conflict cannot remain neutral, that the translator cannot remain a 
marginal on the border of the conflict. The occasional failure of the 
translator's self-erasure cannot simply be dismissed as "distortion" 
caused by ethnic allegiance. The translator's failure, her need to testify, 
is part and parcel of the historical narrative she translates. The 
translator's testimony is a part of transmission since, as Claude 
Lanzmann says, "[t]he only objectivity is the esprit départi"11 In other 
words, the parti pris of the translator is also a part of the transmission 
of war. Not to recognize that "distortion" is an integral part of the 
process, is perhaps to silence the war and its scandals. 
The translator inhabits a double bind: on the one hand, she is 
central to the testimonial process, while, simultaneously, she is forced 
by neutrality into the margins of the process she enables. By turning the 
translator into a metaphor, the theory of testimony repeats this double 
bind. But if the translator is not allowed to be a witness herself, how 
can then translation be "une métaphore de tout témoignage."?12 What 
does it mean to use translation as a metaphor of testimony, if the 
translator, the agent of translation, cannot bear witness? To reinscribe 
her self-erasure, then, within the structure of testimony is to question 
the validity of the metaphorical link between translation and testimony, 
a questioning which the theory of testimony, in repeating the double 
bind, not only allows, but also invites. 
In Testimony. Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History, both Felman and Laub treat the issue of 
what can be called failed testimony, precisely as the "crises of 
"The Obscenity of Understanding: An Evening with Claude Lanzmann" in 
Caruth, Cathy ed., Trauma. Explorations in Memory. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995. pp. 200-220. 
12 ' 
Anny Dayan-Rosenman, "Shoah : L' Echo du silence," m Au Sujet de Shoah. 
pp. 188-197. 
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witnessing." They are concerned with the impossibility to witness and 
the inadequacy of eye-witnessing to say what it bore witness to in any 
straightforward terms. Therefore, the witness to the witness, that is, to 
the interviewer, the historian and the spectator, constructs "the 
possibility of seeing again what in fact was never seen the first time, 
what remained originally unseen due to the inherent blinding nature of 
the occurrence" (Felman, p. 255; her emphasis), of the catastrophe. 
Similarly, the translator's testimony cannot be said unless it interrupts 
translation, that is, unless it emerges outside the "original" occurence. 
On the one hand, her interruption can never come in lieu of the 
"original" occurrence of her testimonial desire: "The failure of the 
translator [...] is thus exemplary in that it is a failure to see, a failure to 
witness history in its original occurrence" (Felman, p. 159; her 
emphasis). On the other hand, she bears witness to the "original" 
occurrence of translation only outside of translation. Failure turns into 
something other than failure: it becomes a testimony to her role of 
translator, which is otherwise erased and forgotten, unless in the 
negative form of "distortion." Thus, the failure which is inherent in the 
structure of witnessing, returns as a testimony, as a "translation," as it 
were, of eye-witnessing the unseeable, and Felman's theory of 
testimony accounts for its own lack of consideration of the translator's 
testimony. The failure of the theory of testimony to consider the 
position of the translator, to bear witness, as it were, to the translator, is 
part and parcel of the testimonial process, a process which inherently 
fails and thus demands that these failures be addressed, over and over 
again, as parts of the "erasure" inherent in "the functioning of our 
history" (Felman, p. 253; her emphasis)13. 
Thus, paradoxically, while it has not accounted for the 
translator's "translation" of literal meaning into testimony, the theory of 
testimony has nevertheless made the translator, through the use of 
metaphor, essential to our understanding of the process of historical 
transmission. To say that "[t]he namelessness of a catastrophe" 
constitutes the "crises of testimony," is to say that the literality of the 
This article is thus an attempt to reinscribe into the theory of testimony, in 
agreement with Felman's theory of testimonial failure, a reading of the failure 
of translation which serves as the translator's testimony, but one which no 
longer corresponds with her initial desire to bear witness to the war. However, 
the translator's testimony, that is the failure of translation, remains hard, and 
perhaps impossible, to "translate," for the testimony of the translator occurs 
only at the moment when translation is outside of itself. 
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event cannot be witnessed because (and unless) it is under the mark of 
an erasure. I argue that this same literality cannot be translated either, 
unless in a crisis, as a "distortion," in other words, as a failure. The 
specificity of the translator's position, then, allows us to see that the 
metaphor of translation lies, first of all, as Felman proposes, in the 
foreignness in and of languages representing the unsayable foreignness 
of the event: "The original is killed because there is no possible 
witnessing of the original event" (Felman, p. 159). Witnessing and 
bearing witness emerge from under a mark of an erasure, a failure, 
albeit a "distortion," precisely the kind of mark of erasure under which 
the translator works. Secondly, the distance between the original event, 
witnessing and bearing witness, is incarnated in the very foreignness 
which the translator's distortion imposes on the testimony: "Translation 
is the metaphor of a new relation to the past, a relation that cannot 
resemble [...] any past relation to the past but that consists, essentially, 
in the historical performance of a radical discontinuity" (Felman, p. 
162). This inscription of discontinuity is a literal inscription of erasure 
on history. In other words, distortion is not a performance of an erasure, 
rather it is the inscription of the erasure back into history. It is the index 
pointing at erasure, thereby allowing us to "grasp the ways" of 
"erasure" in history (Felman, p. 253). Finally, it is precisely in this 
literal inscription that translation emerges as a metaphor that is not a 
metaphor. If "translation [. . .] becomes a metaphor for the historical 
necessity of bearing witness" (Felman, p. 153), it does so because it is 
already the translator's "historical necessity," and, indeed, impossibility 
to bear witness. The metaphor, which is not one, bears witness to the 
distortion and the erasure always already at work in witnessing, 
testimony and in translation. 
As we saw, the translator's distortion says that which cannot 
be said in the moment of translating the testimony, or even giving the 
testimony. Her intervention in the testimonial process interrupts 
history: history as testimony and history as translation. The "distortion" 
testifies to the task of the translator, it is a testimony which can happen 
only outside translation, outside of its own frame of reference, in the 
moment when translation stops. It is here that the full specificity of the 
translator as a witness emerges and sets her off from the other 
"translators'Vwitnesses. A witness to translation outside of her own 
performance, the translator turns translation into a theory of translation. 
The position of the translator and the emergence of theory of translation 
are thus dependent one on the other: the theory of translation is born 
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out of failure, out of failure to maintain its own task and condition of 
translatability. 
However, to constitute itself outside of its own performance 
must bring about a failure of theory. Theories of translation repeat the 
erasure of the position of the translator in "privilégiant l'étude des 
structures et des processus [...] dans l'échange."14 Theory often erases 
that which (or the one who) gives birth to it, as if wanting to silence its 
own place of origin, because that place of origin is the one of failure. 
Beyond testifying to the original inadequacy of translation, which is the 
mark of the untranslatable, theories of translation should also bear 
witness to the task of the translator. The fact that there is a need to 
erase in such general terms its own point of origin would indicate that 
there is a possibility of considering the case of wartime translators in 
generalized terms: that there is indeed an agency of the translator which 
always disrupts translation and thus shows that translation is not 
outside of the functioning of history, not outside its own historicizing 
narrative, but rather complicitous with it. Thus it is that by reinscribing 
the translator, her position and her "distortion" into the processes of 
historical transmission, as well as into theories of testimony and of 
translation, that our understanding and knowledge of history changes: 
"To understand Shoah is not to know the Holocaust, but to gain new 
insights into what not knowing means, to grasp the ways in which 
erasure is itself part of the functioning of our history" (Felman, p. 253; 
her emphasis). 
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